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Tim Sonnreich, November 2005. Part 2 - Rebuilding Iraq
In Part 1 of this article I tried to show that negotiation with hostage takers in Iraq is a plausible policy. But just because we can negotiate, doesn't mean we should. This section is devoting to showing why the democratic reconstruction of Iraq hinges on negotiating. Status of Reconstruction in Iraq Whether the trends in Iraq are looking up or down is a matter of deep conjecture, but we do know that the insurgency is not getting weaker. Late in October 2005 the US military chalked up its 2000th fatality (after the major combat phase was declared over). An analysis of the figures shows that the first 1000 were killed in insurgent attacks over the course of 18 months. The second thousand were killed in around 14 months. Clearly the insurgency is adapting and surviving. Meanwhile, there is also plenty of evidence to suggest that failure to successfully negotiate with insurgents is playing a part in stalling reconstruction efforts. What's my analysis for that? Well start by asking yourself; what does Iraq need to be a functioning state and a functioning democracy? Most of the answers are pretty easy. To be a functioning state it needs security - internal and border security. It needs good relations with its neighbours and it needs a functioning economy and a population that has adequate health care, education and other services (water, electricity, sewage etc). To be considered a reasonably good democracy it needs the rule of law, independent public institutions - which require a free press - and proper access to, and representation from, the political process.
Well the answer to the first question is a simple matter of public record. The hostages are overwhelmingly NGO workers, like Margaret Hassan of CARE International, journalists and diplomats. The effect of losing those people is clear - Hassan was a tireless worker for the needs of the Iraqi people, and the impact of her loss cannot easily be quantified. Put simply, Iraqis have lost one of the most effective and compassionate voices, along with all the practical assistance that people like her can bring to Iraq. But the effect is even worse than that. When someone like Hassan is killed it sends shockwaves through the whole NGO community and a great many NGO workers have left Iraq as a result. The impact of this is obviously devastating. Without an army of NGO workers, Iraq's reconstruction is impossible - and that's exactly what is happening now, on a wide scale. Let me simply quote from an interview with Rajiv Chandransekaran of the Washington Post, on the day it was revealed that Hassan had been killed. The interview aired on my favourite American (PBS) TV current affairs program NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (shown on SBS TV):
And things are not improving. Two stories taken from the ABC and IHT in the last month are just latest in a never ending stream of bad news stories about how reconstruction has stalled, and how the living standards of Iraqis are deteriorating.
I won't labour this point, because I think you can see it pretty clearly - the more that governments allow NGO workers to be killed by the insurgents, the more these vital people will leave Iraq. The net effect is to remove the very people who are needed to revive the country's economy and build its society - which are the very things needed to defeat the bulk of the insurgency. But even though things look bad for Iraq, and many NGOs and other civilians have fled Iraq, it's not too late to restore some of the confidence and lure those vital workers back. According to Human Rights Watch;
In other words, most hostages are released (not a fact widely recognised) by their abductors (due to the sort of secret negotiations that secured the release of the Two Simona's no doubt) and there is still time to save most of the remaining 43. If it was made clear (privately at least to the NGO groups and diplomats, if saying so publicly was difficult) that governments/companies will do everything reasonable and practical to secure their release, and that most (we could make it as high as ¾'s) of all hostages are released, then many more people would be willing to take the risk. At the moment the perception is that most hostages die (if few of those currently missing are released, then that sentiment will become a fact). In addition to that there is a security benefit that comes from getting hostages back - namely increased intelligence about the structure and workings of the insurgent groups. This is a major benefit and something that can be developed into a full extension but I'll leave that point there for now. The bottom line is that NGO workers are crucial to reconstruction and reconstruction is crucial to destroying the motivation and recruitment potential of most insurgent groups. Of those 3 groups in part one, the 3rd group - the criminals - are simply opportunistic (see the Human Rights Watch report if you need further corroboration of this fact). They take hostages because they can (because there is weak security) and because it's the only way to make money. If the country could be stabilised, then there would be investment and the development of the economy - but that won't happen if NGO staff leave and if foreign investors are too scared to start up businesses. Equally, many of 2nd group - the political/nationalist groups - have taken up arms because they believe (rightly to a certain extent) that it's the only way to ensure that they get a share of the resources and that they get listened to. Only the establishment of a functioning political system, that has accountability, will dilute people's incentive to support violence of this kind. And again, not protecting hostages is the wrong way to do it. Because one of the other favoured targets is the media, and just like the NGO workers, when a reporter is beheaded, other reporters flee. The lack of independent media hampers the reconstruction because it reduces people's trust in the Coalition military and in the fledgling Iraqi institutions. And the evidence is clear - the best estimate I've seen is that two-thirds of all the journalists killed in Iraq (there has been about 80 in total) were killed by insurgents. Of course not all of these people could have been saved. Some were killed in battles, some were taken hostage by groups who were not willing to negotiate, but the point is simple enough - journalists in war zones understand the risks of being killed in a battle, but they will not tolerate the risk of being brutally beheaded because their governments thinks it's wrong to talk to terrorists. And it's hard to blame them. Conclusion So put it all together and what do you get?
Then you have a strong case for negotiation. It might be the lesser of two evils, but it's a vitally important choice. If those people who are best equipped to construct a viable civil society in Iraq are allowed to be butchered, or to flee in fear of such a fate, then we've already lost in Iraq. It's pretty clear that a simple miliary victory in Iraq over the insurgents is unlikely. So instead we'll have to break the cycle of violence and instability plaguing Iraq, and we need civilian organisations to do that. Back to MAD Homepage |
