While the US military grapples with the challenges of 'winning the peace' in Iraq, back in the Pentagon they have already shifted their attention to planning for the next generation of conflicts.
Although arguably they should have noticed a little sooner, it has occurred to the important people in the Department of Defence that the US's placement of foreign military bases is a little outdated now that the Cold War has ended. For example, it's hard to explain why there are still 70,000 US troops stationed in Germany, including the 1st Armoured Division and the 1st Infantry Division. Or more to the point, why most of the 100,000 odd troops that are stationed in Western Europe are still there. Who are they defending and against what threat? Meanwhile the 140,000 troops in Iraq, many of whom are reservists, are struggling to establish some sort of order, while some of the best-trained professional soldiers are living it up in Germany.
Not only would reallocating these troops to Iraq improve the average level of skills and training amongst US forces, but it would also help to alleviate the chronic shortage of 'trigger pullers' available for active deployment. Thanks to the RMA doctrine the US army has not only shrunk to its lowest level in roughly three-decades, but the remaining forces have been restructured to the needs of a truly global empire. As US military forces project influence further and further from home they require ever greater levels of logistical support - what military planners call the Army's "tail" to keep the combat forces, or "teeth" equipped and in communication with command. The US "tooth-to-tail" ratio, or the number of actual fighting men in relation to the number of non-fighting support staff that go with them to battlegrounds is 1:7. That's one 'trigger-puller' for every seven logistics, communications, transport (etc) staff that accompany them. That's the lowest ratio of any military in the world and getting progressively lower.
Another ratio that illustrates the level of crisis that currently confronts defence planners is the so-called (you knew I would mention it) "rule of threes". The rule of threes is the Army's model for peak combat efficiency during times of conflict. It states (quite logically really) that the military can only sustain deployments for extended periods if no more than 1/3 of the army is in active duty, while 1/3 are resting from being on active duty and a further 1/3 are training and preparing to enter active duty. With this triangle deployment structure the army can maintain its presence indefinitely (excluding issues like funding and significant casualties). At the moment more than 50% of all US soldiers are on active duty somewhere amongst the 120-odd US military installations worldwide. It doesn't take a genius to see that is unsustainable.
It doesn't help that the US's principle ally, Britain, is also militarily stretched to breaking point. Fully a quarter of the entire British military was involved in the invasion of Iraq, while at the same time there were Pommy troops in Afghanistan, the Balkans and Northern Ireland. To make matters worse the Blair government announced in August that it will cut 20,000 jobs from the military, including the lose of a fifth of all the Navy's surface ships, and a quarter of the Army's tanks. At present about 20% of the UK military is currently on active duty (counting the 9000 stationed in Iraq, which could rise) and unlike their US ally, this is considered the peak deployment rate. There are simply not enough troops or money in the budget to embark on any additional activities. The UK doesn't even rate amongst the world's largest ten militaries, so that gives you a sense of how limited its capacities are already.
In a move consistent with RMA, the British Ministry of Defence argues that with the cost savings that will come from sacking 20,000 people, the military can invest in new technologies that will enhance their capabilities. Although that may be true, very few pieces of advanced technology can conduct peace-keeping or restore security to the streets of Iraq.
This is not meant to suggest that all of the cold-war era bases/forces should be removed, although the DoD has hinted that up to half will be, because they do serve some useful purposes, but not as many as they used to.
Review, for example, the allocation of forces in North Asia. In Japan there are 47,000, about three quarters located in Okinawa and South Korea is home to 37,000 randy American boys and girls. Again the question needs to be asked, exactly who are they protecting and from whom?
In the case of South Korea the answer seems easy enough - those pesky, and slightly eccentric, North Koreans. True, North Korea is pretty threatening, and its million or so soldiers are just sitting around waiting for the order to slaughter their southern cousins. But what are 47,000 Americans gonna do about an invasion by the worlds fifth largest army? Firstly the real fear of North Korea stems from its nuclear arsenal, which isn't really going to be affected by ground forces. Secondly their missile and artillery forces are a massive threat to Seoul, but again, ground troops can't do a lot about that. So really they are there in the unlikely event of a full-scale ground assault by the north. OK lets examine that.
Although SK spends 'only' US$15 billion on defence its still a highly trained and effective military in its own right. It's worth recognising that although smaller then their northern neighbour, South Korea still ranks about 6th in terms of the world's largest armies, which is only slightly behind the technologically inferior North Korean military which ranks about 4th. Also as the world's 11th largest economy South Korea could well afford to increase its defence budget if that was deemed necessary.
Plus the US would retain the ability to offer substantial military assistance, at very short notice, from its forces in Japan and its Pacific fleet, including the USS Kitty Hawk carrier battle group. Following that US forces would be dispatched, most likely along with numerous other allied nations like Australia. In any event the initial assault by NK would be devastating. Some estimates by the DoD suggest that 300,000 or more SK soldiers would be killed in the first 90 days of an all-out attack by the North (not to mention the civilian deaths) but again, 47,000 Americans can't prevent that.
In Japan the calculations are done a little differently. Firstly Japan is notionally a pacifist state, due to the restrictions on the aggressive use, or threatened use, of military force under Article 9 of the MacArthurian constitution. Regardless of these (rapidly diminishing) limitations, Japan has built a truly formidable military, mostly equipped with weapons and technology from the US!
The Japanese air force has 46,000 personnel and around 360 combat aircraft (including 203 F-15 fighter-bombers, which are pretty cool in their own right). The Japanese army has 160,000 soldiers, plus 45,000 reserve troops. It is equipped with 1070 tanks, a similar number of artillery guns and about 90 attack helicopters. Not bad, ehm for a "Self Defence Force"!
The US is eager to see Japan take a more active military stance, to help stabilise the region in relation to the Taiwan Strait and North Korea, as well as in international peacekeeping. Since 1992 Japanese peacekeepers have been sent on missions to Cambodia, Namibia, Mozambique, Pakistan, Afghanistan, East Timor, Indonesia and Guam. Plus Japan sent Aegis destroyers to help enforce the naval blockade of Iraq.
In any event the US is not proposing to pull out of SK entirely. It has stated that a third of its troops, or 12,500 men will be reassigned, and remaining forces will be moved to a new base further south than Seoul. In Japan the moves are designed to consolidate the almost two-dozen bases into something more manageable. It appears that Japan is set to become the hub from which the US will secure its interests in North Asia, in particular with relation to Taiwan and China.
So where are the new US bases going to be?
Good question. The US intends to redeploy its forces to smaller, more widely dispersed facilities - sometimes called "lily pads" - along an "arc of crisis" stretching from Southeast Asia to West Africa, as well as to bases in Guam and back home. Essentially the US sees Central Asia (so the 'Stans' across to Pakistan) and the Maghreb (North Africa and the Gulf) and Southeast Asia (principally, NK, Southern Philippines and maybe Indonesia) as the probable location for future conflicts and/or interventions.
To position itself more favourably in respect to these regions, the US is developing bases in Eastern Europe in places like Romania, in strategically placed Djibouti on the Horn of Africa, and across several states in Central Asia. There is also talk of a new listening post to be built in Cyprus, if the divided island ever sorts itself out. Not only are these locations closer to potential trouble spots, but also they are also far cheaper than maintaining large bases in a country like Germany.
The real issues created by this reorganisation are less security and more diplomatic. Germany is a little unhappy about the American plans, as is South Korea. One concern they have is for their security (although Germany has little to fear) in the sense that US bases signify an ongoing commitment and engagement by the US in their region. For example the US has maintained an airbase in Iceland since the 1950's, and subsequently Iceland never developed its own air force.
More troubling is the unilateral manner in which the US announced its new plans. Given that both the German and South Korean bases have been in place for 50 years, and make a considerable impact on the local economy and the defence planning of their host nations, for the Americans to cut them without consultation with their allies is a touch rude. It is seen as emblematic of the Bush Administration's disdain for 'old Europe' and for multi-lateral decision-making and further proof of America's unilateral tendencies in military affairs.
Furthermore, especially in relation to Korea, reducing the US presence there during delicate 6-party talks on security might be interpreted by the North Koreans as a sign of weakness or disinterest by the US. It might encourage the North to consider military action more seriously and by making other states in the region feel less secure, it might provoke poor policy decisions by a range of governments.
Alternatively this may turn out to be a very wise move by the US. Just as removing its forces from Saudi Arabia recently was designed to reduce tensions with the Arab world, decreasing the US's 'footprint' in Asia may also stem the growing anti-American sentiment. The bases in Okinawa and South Korea have been highly divisive in the last few decades with reports of US Marines engaging in numerous criminal activities including both violent and sexual crimes. In 2000 a marine was arrested for sexually assaulting a 14-year-old girl and an airman was accused of a hit and run accident. Five years before those incidents, three marines were convicted of raping a 12-year-old girl. And the list goes on.
Its important to understand the US does not view any single military action or base as isolated. Everything is now considered in the context of its emerging global strategy for the 21st century. The implications of these decisions will be massive, not simply for the states that will lose/gain a US military installation, but for every nation in their region. When the world's most powerful military decides that it needs a change of scenery, we are all affected.
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